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PROTECTING PROPERTY RIGHTS WITH
STRICT SCRUTINY: AN ARGUMENT FOR
THE "SPECIFICALLY AND UNIQUELY
ATTRIBUTABLE" STANDARD
Daniel William Russo*
The Fifth Amendment is not about property or about com-
merce. It is about individuals; it is about fairness; and it is about
freedom.'
Introduction
Consider a builder who purchases a piece of property in a small
city in order to build an apartment complex on the land. After
submitting his plan to the local government, the builder is told that
the permits to build are conditioned on whether or not he agrees to
give a percentage of his land back to the city or pay an "impact
fee."2 The government explains that a study has found that the
new complex will exacerbate the problems of overcrowded
schools3 and traffic congestion,4 and that the conditions are being
imposed to offset these implications.
The builder does not believe he should have to give any of his
land back or pay any fees, other than those normally imposed. He
alleges that the city is conditioning permits to which he is entitled,
* Fordham University School of Law, J.D. Candidiate, 1999, Hofstra University,
B.A., 1996. I would like to thank Professor William Treanor, Fordham University
School of Law, and Lindsay Feinberg for their guidance in preparing this Note. I
would also like to thank my family who has always encouraged and supported me in
my endeavors.
1. Roger Marzulla et al., Debate, Taking "Taking Rights" Seriously: A Debate On
Property Rights Legislation Before The 104th Congress, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 253, 258
(1995).
2. See Noreen A. Murphy, Note, The Viability of Impact Fees After Nollan and
Dolan, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 203, 204 (1.996) ("An impact fee, a species of the devel-
opment exaction, is a monetary charge imposed on developers as a condition of pro-
ject approval.").
3. See Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799
(11. 1961) (deciding whether an exaction of land in order to alleviate the problem of
overcrowded schools was constitutional).
4. See Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass'n v. County of DuPage, 649 N.E.2d
384 (Il1. 1995) (deciding whether the application of transportation impact fees was
constitutional).
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on whether he pays a price the city determines is fair. 5 This price,
however, is not based on any evidence or material fact, and the city
gives no guarantee that the price paid will be used to fix the poten-
tial problem(s) they are citing.6 The builder is then faced with a
dilemma: pay a fee he did not calculate into his costs and threaten
profit; reduce the size of his land by a percentage dictated by the
city; or sell his land and attempt to build elsewhere.7 The builder,
however, is not satisfied with any of the options presented by the
city, so he decides to sue the municipality, alleging that the condi-
tion imposed is an unconstitutional regulatory taking under the
Fifth Amendment.8
This scenario, while simplified, highlights some of the compli-
cated questions that arise in regulatory takings cases. It presents
the question of how a private citizen's property rights should be
protected against government action. Some scholars argue that the
takings issue is controversial because the United States Supreme
Court did not provide any guidance for many years.9 Because of
this silence, state courts developed their own standards to deter-
mine when a regulation constituted a taking.1" The state standards
are similar in that each requires some type of relationship between
the exaction imposed and the harm posed by the proposed devel-
5. See id.
6. See Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay v. City of Walnut
Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (1971) (holding that a required dedication is constitutional so
long as it results in any public benefit).
7. See Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965). In
Jordan, the developer was presented with the options described in the accompanying
text. See id. at 443.
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states "[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." See generally Northern
Illinois Home Builders Ass'n, 649 N.E.2d 384 (Ill. 1995).
9. See Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings: The De-
veloper's Perspective, 20 URB. LAw. 515, 525 n.57 (1988) (discussing the Supreme
Court's lack of guidance on the takings issue and how this affected the development
of the issue).
10. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). The Court states, "Since
state courts have been dealing with this question a good deal longer than we have, we
turn to representative decisions made by them." Id. at 389. The Court further ex-
plains that, despite some variations, state courts employ one of three general stan-
dards in determining regulatory takings cases. See id. at 389-91. First is the "judicial
deference" standard, which is the least restrictive and thus favors municipalities. See
id. Second is the "rational nexus" test, considered the intermediate standard, favoring
neither municipalties nor developers. See id. at 390-91. Third is the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" test. See id. at 389-90. This standard uses the court's strictest
scrutiny in determining the validity of the exaction, and is therefore the standard most
favorable to the party on which the condition is being.imposed. See id.
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opment.11 The fundamental difference among the various stan-
dards is the degree of nexus the respective state courts require
municipalities to demonstrate in order to validate the imposition of
the exaction.' 2
In 1994, the Supreme Court decided Dolan v. City of Tigard'3
and adopted an intermediate standard of review for takings cases.
This Note argues that this intermediate test does not sufficiently
protect the property rights of individuals. Instead, this Note pro-
poses that courts reviewing required exactions use a higher stan-
dard of scrutiny, particularly the "specifically and uniquely
attributable" test adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court.
14
Part I provides a background of the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause and outlines three significant United States Supreme Court
takings cases: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon;5 Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Commission;16 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.17 Part II
discusses the three levels of scrutiny that states apply when decid-
ing regulatory takings cases: (1) the "judicial deference" standard;
(2) the "rational nexus" standard; and (3) the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" test. Part III analyzes the scope and appli-
cation of Nollan and Dolan, and argues that the "judicial defer-
ence" and "rational nexus" standards are inefficient in deciding
regulatory takings cases. This Note concludes that the "specifically
and uniquely attributable" test is most effective in deciding such
11. See Christopher J. St. Jeanos, Dolan v. Tigard and the Rough Proportionality
Test: Roughly Speaking, Why Isn't a Nexus Enough?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1883, 1888
(1995) (stating that "[v]irtually every state court, when faced with a challenge related
to development exactions, has required some sort of relationship between the exac-
tion and a harm indentified with the proposed development.").
12. See Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, "'Take' My Beach Please!": Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional Analysis of Development
Exactions, 69 B.U. L. REV. 823, 864 (1989). "While every state court has embraced
this principle, they have sometimes differed on how close of a nexus the municipality
must demonstrate in order to validate the exaction." Id.
13. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
14. See Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799,
802 (Ill. 1961). In explaining the "specifically and uniquely attributable" standard, the
Court states:
If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to the municipality
and if the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely attrib-
utable to his activity, then the requirement is permissible; if not, it is forbid-
den and amounts to a confiscation of private property in contravention of
the constitutional prohibitions rather than reasonable regulation under the
police power.
Id.; accord McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 270 N.E.2d 370 (Ohio 1971).
15. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
16. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
17. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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cases because it properly balances the protection of fundamental
private property rights with government regulations.
I. The Historic Evolution and Development of the
Takings Clause
The political philosopher, John Locke, insisted that the only rea-
son men created government was to protect the property rights of
individuals. 8 The protection of property rights, however, has
changed since the days of Locke.19 The development of the Tak-
ings Clause is a good example of the evolution of real property law.
A. The Legislative Intent
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohib-
its the government from taking private land from landowners with-
out compensation."0 In writing the Fifth Amendment, James
Madison was concerned with protecting the individual against the
government and the majority it represents.2 By including the pro-
tection of property rights, Madison provided citizens with a sphere
in which they were independent and secure in exercising other ba-
sic civil rights without government interference.22 The Takings
Clause ("Clause") was a solution to a problem Madison felt
strongly about: protecting property rights against failures in the
political process.23
18. See ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN, 3
(Transactions Books eds., 1987).
19. See Andrew S. Yagoda, Dolan v. Tigard: Taking A New Look At An Old Tak-
ings Issue, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 351, 353 (1995), "The law of real property usually
develops in an evolutionary fashion. Change is often measured in terms of decades
and centuries rather then in months and years." (quoting Grant S. Nelson & Dale A.
Whitman, Congressional Preemption of Mortgage Due-on-Sale Law: An Analysis of
the Garn-St. Germain Act, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 243 (1983)).
20. See supra note 8.
21. See D. Benjamin Barros, Defining "Property" In The Just Compensation
Clause, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1853, 1856 (1995).
22. See id. at 1856 (citing William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Origi-
nal Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE
L.J. 694, 699 (1985)); see also Marzulla, supra note 1. "Our system of private prop-
erty is also essential to all of the other civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Property rights provide citizens with the independence and security they need to exer-
cise their rights to free speech, freedom of religion and other basic civil rights." Id. at
258.
23. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding Of The Takings
Clause And The Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 836-37 (1995).
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where arbi-
trary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of its citizens
that free use of their faculties, and free choice of their occupations, which
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Although Madison's reasons for authoring the Clause are clear,
his intent concerning its scope is an issue of debate. E" This debate
has been fueled considerably by the United States Supreme
Court's attempts to determine the Clause's scope when deciding
takings cases.25 The controversy surrounding the Clause lies in the
interpretation of its language and its application in takings cases.2 6
Despite its use in regulatory takings actions since the late 1800s,27
many questions remain unanswered.28
B. Judicial Scrutiny In Supreme Court Takings Cases
In 1922, the Supreme Court decided Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,2 9 a case which arose because the Mahons owned the sur-
face rights to a plot of land above a coal deposit to which the Penn-
sylvania Coal Company ("Company") owned the subsurface
rights.3 ° When the Company sought to begin mining, the Mahons
sued claiming the mining of the coal violated the Kohler Act.31
The Company defended against the Mahon's suit by claiming that
the Kohler Act deprived it of its property rights without just com-
pensation and therefore constituted a regulatory taking.32
The Court agreed with the Company and held that the Kohler
Act, as applied to these facts, constituted a regulatory taking in
which just compensation was due.33 This decision invalidated a
land use regulation because, as Justice Holmes stated, it went "too
not only constitute their property in the general sense of the word; but are
the means of acquiring property strictly so called.
Id. at 838 (quoting James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETrE, Mar. 27, 1792, in 14
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266, 267 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983)).
24. See generally id. (discussing the debate over the intended scope of the Takings
Clause and posing the question whether it was Madison's intention to limit the
Clause's application to physical takings only, or to protect property rights from gov-
ernment regulations which limit property use.).
25. See id. at 782.
26. See Morosoff, supra note 12, at 832.
27. See Treanor, supra note 23, at 795-97.
28. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) ("[T]his
Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining
when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated
on a few persons."). Id. at 124.
29. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
30. See id. at 412. This right was expressly granted in the deed conveying the
surface rights. See id.
31. See id. at 412-13. The Kohler Act forbade the removal of coal when such min-
ing would cause subsidence of structures such as homes. 1921 Pa. Laws 1198.
32. See id. at 395.
33. See id. at 415.
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far."'34 However, the question of when a regulation went "too far,"
and therefore constituted a regulatory taking, remained unclear for
decades because the Supreme Court failed to enact a bright line
test.
Sixty five years after Pennsylvania Coal, however, the Supreme
Court decided Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,36 and fi-
nally addressed the lingering questions surrounding the regulatory
takings issue. As required by California law, the Nollans applied
for a building permit with the California Coastal Commission
("Commission") to erect a three-story home on their beachfront
lot.37 The Commission granted the permit under the condition that
the Nollans grant an easement across a portion of their land for
public access between two public beaches.38  The Nollans chal-
lenged this condition on the grounds that it constituted a regula-
tory taking.39
34. See id. Justice Holmes states:
[W]e see no more authority for supplying the latter without compensation
than there was for taking the right of way in the first place and refusing to
pay for it because the public wanted it very much. The protection of private
property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public
use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without just compen-
sation .... The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if the regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.
Id.
35. See Morosoff, supra note 12, at 837 (describing the "ad hoc" process the re-
viewing court must engage in when deciding takings claims); see also id. at 842-43
nn.135-37 (explaining that, in several cases after Pennsylvania Coal, the Court either
rejected the takings claim because it did not deny the landowner all the use of the
property or it simply ignored the takings claim and decided the case on other
grounds).
36. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
37. See id. at 827. The Nollans owned a beachfront lot with a small bungalow on
it. When the bungalow fell into disrepair and was no longer worth fixing, the Nollans
decided to destroy it and build a three story beachfront home. The opinion states, "In
order to do so, under Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. §§ 30106, 30212, and 30600 (West
1986), they were required to obtain a coastal development permit from the California
Coastal Commission." Id. at 825.
38. See id. at 825.
39. See id. at 828-30. Upon challenging the imposition of the easement condition,
the Nollans were granted an evidentiary hearing in order to determine the validity of
the condition. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission reaffirmed the ease-
ment condition on the basis that the new home would create a "psychological" barrier
between the beach and the public, placing a burden on the public's right to use the
beach. See id. at 828-29. The Commission reasoned that the easement was justified
because it somewhat offset this burden. See id. The Nollans then filed a writ of ad-
ministrative mandamus with the California Superior Court and were successful in get-
ting the easement condition struck down. See id. at 829. The California Court of
Appeals then reversed, holding that the permit condition was valid because it was
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia stated that in order for a
government to legitimately regulate private property, there must
be an "essential nexus" between the imposed condition and the
harm sought to be prevented.4" Applying this new standard to the
facts of the case, the Court held that no such nexus existed,41 and
that the Commission would have to pay for an easement across the
Nollan's property under the Fifth Amendment.42
Despite clarifying some aspects of the takings issue, Nollan also
left some important questions unanswered. First, to what type of
government regulation was the "essential nexus" .standard sup-
posed to be applied,4 3 and was the standard limited to physical ded-
ications of property or could it also be applied to conditions like
impact fees? Second, and perhaps most importantly, the Court did
not decide the required degree of connection between the condi-
tion imposed and the projected impact of the development once
the "essential nexus" between the state purpose and the condition
was established.4
Seven years later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dolan
v. City of Tigard,45 to "resolve a question left open by [its] decision
in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n... of what is the required
sufficiently related to the impact of the Nollan's new home. See id. at 830. The Court
of Appeals stated that even if the home was not the sole reason for the need created
and the relationship between the two was only indirect, the condition was still consti-
tutionally valid. See id. The Nollans appealed to the Supreme Court, and were
granted certiorari. See id.
Justice Scalia began the Court's analysis by reciting the general rule that a land use
regulation is not a taking if it "substantially advances a legitimate state interest" and
does not "den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land(.)" See id. at 834
(quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). Scalia also accepted the Com-
mission's argument that protecting the public's ability to see the beach is a legitimate
state interest. Scalia states, "We assume, without deciding, that this is so...", refer-
ring to the Commission's argument that protecting the view of the beach is a legiti-
•mate state interest. See id. at 835.
40. See id. at 837.
41. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. The easement imposed on the Nollans, forcing the
Nollans to allow the public to use their land to get from one public beach to another,
in no way remedied the problem the Commission was citing, the obstruction of the
public's view of the beach.
42. See id. at 841-42. Unless the Commission compensated the Nollans, the ease-
ment imposed was "an out and out plan of extortion." Id.
43. See Mark W. Cordes, Discretionary Limits in Local-Land Use Control, Legal
Limits On Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan And Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L.
REv. 513, 528 (1995). "Because Nollan involved the unusual scenario where there is
no connection between an exaction and development impact, the full import of the
'essential nexus' standard was left undeveloped." Id. at 527.
44. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 236.
45. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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degree of connection between the exactions imposed by the city
and the projected impacts of the proposed development. '4 6 In-
tending to expand her store, Ms. Dolan submitted a plan to the city
in which she proposed to knock down the existing store and build a
larger one with additional parking spaces. 47 Based on Tigard's new
Community Development Code ("CDC"),48 the city approved Ms.
Dolan's permit application but attached two conditions to the pro-
posal. First, she was to dedicate to the City of Tigard the portion of
her property lying in the 100-year floodplain of Fanno Creek.49
Second, Ms. Dolan was required to dedicate an additional fifteen
feet of land next to the floodplain. 0 In total, the dedications re-
quired by Tigard constituted approximately 7,000 square feet or
ten percent of Ms. Dolan's land."
Ms. Dolan contested the required dedications, asserting that
they constituted a taking of private property without just compen-
46. Id. at 377 (granting certiorari on Petitioner's challenging of the Oregon
Supreme Court which held that the City of Tigard could condition the granting of her
building permit on the condition that Ms. Dolan dedicate a portion of her property).
47. See id. Petitioner, Florence Dolan, owned a plumbing and electrical supply
store in Tigard, Oregon. The 9,700 square feet of store was situated on the east side
of a 1.67-acre parcel of land which also included a gravel parking lot. Fanno Creek
ran adjacent to the lot flowing through the land on the southwest corner. The first
phase of Ms. Dolan's proposal called for 17,600 square feet of store and a paved 39
space parking lot, the second phase called for an additional building and more park-
ing spaces. See id. at 379.
48. See id. at 378-80. Prior to Dolan's permit application, the state of Oregon
required all the cities and counties of Oregon to pass a land use plan consistent with
the state's planning goals. See id. Tigard's Community Development Code required
all landowners in the area zoned "Central Business District" to comply with a 15%
open space and landscaping requirement. See id.
49. See id. at 380-81. Tigard sought this land in order to improve the drainage
system along the creek. See id. A portion of Tigard's Community Development Code
addressed flooding problems with Fanno Creek. The plan established that an increase
in impervious surfaces (i.e., paved parking lots) would increase the flooding problems.
It also suggested a number of ways to decrease the flooding including channel excava-
tion next to Dolan's property and keeping the floodplain free of structures. See id. at
379-80. The plan concluded that the costs of remedying the flooding problem would
be shared with property owners. Owners along the creek would pay more because of
the direct benefit they would receive from the improvements. See id.
50. See id. at 380-81. This portion of land was to be used as a pedestrian/bicycle
pathway because a transportation study identified automobile congestion in the Cen-
tral Business District as a problem. See id. at 380-83. This pathway was intended to
give people an alternative to using their automobiles on short trips within the district.
See id. at 381-83. The Community Development Code required developers supply the
land for the pathway by dedicating land when beginning new developments. See id. at
379-80.
51. See Dolan, 512 U.S. 380-81.
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sation.52  The Court held that when the required "essential
nexus" 3 is found between the imposed condition and the state's
legitimate purpose, the state must then prove the existence of a
"rough proportionality" between the projected effects of the devel-
opment and the dedication required.54 Applying the two-prong
52. See id. at 381-83. Ms. Dolan took her claim to the Oregon Land Use Board of
Appeals (LUBA) asserting that Tigard's dedication conditions were not related to the
proposed development and therefore constituted a taking. See id. After evaluating
Ms. Dolan's claim, LUBA found a "reasonable relationship" between both conditions
imposed and the proposed development. Concerning the requirement to dedicate
land for the improved drainage system, LUBA found a "reasonable relationship" be-
cause the new building and parking lot would increase impervious surfaces, therefore
increasing the runoff into Fanno Creek. See id. Concerning the dedication for a path-
way, LUBA also found a "reasonable relationship" based on the conclusion that the
larger store would require more employees and attract more customers, therefore
increasing automobile congestion on the roads and in parking lots. See id.
The Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court, both affirmed
LUBA's ruling. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (re-
jecting Dolan's argument that the United States Supreme Court had adopted a
stricter standard then the "reasonable relationship" test, by adopting the "essential
nexus" test in Nollan), affd, 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). After
exhausting the state appellate remedies, Ms. Dolan appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.
53. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
54. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. The opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
states, "No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some
sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development." Id. at 391-92.
Upon adding the "rough proportionality" standard as the second prong in deter-
mining regulatory takings cases, the Court analyzed three different state standards in
order to determine the level of scrutiny required in the test. See id. at 388-91 (discuss-
ing three separate state standards and the level of scrutiny required in each one). The
Court states, "Since state courts have been dealing with this question a good deal
longer then we have, we turn to representative decisions made by them." Id. at 389.
The standard requiring the lowest level of scrutiny is the "judicial deference" stan-
dard. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay v. City of Walnut
Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1971) (holding that required exactions are justified on the
basis of general public need); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d
182 (Mont. 1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966). See
infra Part II.A. The Dolan Court felt this standard was too lax and did not adequately
protect the property owner's rights. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
The standard requiring the highest level of scrutiny was the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" test. See, e.g., McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 270
N.E.2d 370 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971) (holding that the required exaction is permissable
only if it is specifically and uniquely attributable to the developer's activity); Ansuini,
Inc. v. City of Cranston, 264 A.2d 910 (R.I. 1970). See infra Part II.B. The Court felt
this standard was too exact a standard for municipalities to meet. See Dolan, 512 U.S.
at 391.
The majority determined that the intermediate standard, the "rational relationship"
standard, was the required level of scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment. See id. The
opinion states, "We think the 'reasonable relationship' test adopted by a majority of
the state courts is closer to the federal constitutional norm than either of those previ-
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test to the facts in Dolan, the Court held that an "essential nexus"
did exist between the conditions imposed and a legitimate state in-
terest. The Court, however, found that the city failed to meet the
"rough proportionality" standard, and thus the regulation
amounted to a taking.56
II. The State Standards of Review in Regulatory Takings Cases
The Supreme Court, in Dolan, analyzed three different state
standards before selecting the intermediate level of scrutiny used in
deciding the case. 7 The standards are similar in that all require
some degree of relationship between the exaction imposed and the
projected harm of the development.5 8 They differ, however, in the
level of scrutiny a court is required to use when analyzing a munici-
pality's exaction or dedication. 9 In light of the Court's precedent
in Dolan, it is important to understand the origins of the various
state standards.
ously discussed." Id. However, in order to prevent confusion with the term "rational
basis" used to describe the level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court renamed the standard "rough proportionality." See id.
55. See id. at 383-84.
56. See id. at 391-97. As to the dedication of land along Fanno Creek, the majority
found that this dedication was based on "rather tentative findings" that Dolan's de-
velopment would increase storm water flow thereby increasing the city's need to man-
age the land for drainage purposes. See id. at 384. The majority also relied on the fact
that Ms. Dolan's loss of her right to exclude was disproportionate to the City's possi-
ble benefit of controlling floods. See id. at 391. Chief Justice Rehnquist states, "As
we have noted, this right to exclude others is 'one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.'" Id. (quoting Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). The dedication imposed for the
land to be used as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway also failed the "rough proportional-
ity" standard. See id. at 392-97. According to the Court, this dedication was not justi-
fied by the city's finding that the pathway "could" offset some of the projected
increase in traffic congestion. Id. at 397. ("[t]he findings of fact that the bicycle path-
way system 'could offset some of the traffic demand' is a far cry from a finding that
the bicycle pathway system will, or is likely to, offset some of the traffic demand.")
(quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 447 (Or. 1993), cert. granted, 510 U.S.
989 (1993), rev'd 512 U.S. 374 (1994)).
57. See id. at 384-91 (analyzing the state standards of review); see also supra note
54.
58. See John J. Delaney et al., Exactions: A Controversial New Source for Munici-
pal Funds: The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test For Validating Subdivision Exac-
tions, User Impact Fees And Linkage, 50-WTR LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 147-56
(1987) (analyzing the various state standards in exaction cases).
59. See St. Jeanos, supra note 11, at 1888.
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A. The "Judicial Deference" Standard
The "judicial deference" standard requires the lowest level of ju-
dicial scrutiny.60 It requires only a general showing that the condi-
tion imposed may offset the potential harm of the development.6'
This standard requires the reviewing court to automatically accept
the legislative determination that a nexus exists.62 Therefore, the
exaction plan is automatically approved unless the developer can
show that the municipality's reasons for it are meritless. 63 This is
an extraordinarily heavy burden for the developer to meet. 64
In Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County,65 the Montana
Supreme Court applied the "judicial deference" standard in a case
where a developer's plan to subdivide a parcel of land was rejected
because it did not provide for the dedication of land to Yellow-
stone for parks and playgrounds.66 In reviewing the developer's
claim, the Billings Court held that a municipality's determination
that a proposed development may create a need for public land is
sufficient to render the exactions imposed constitutional.67 This
holding suggests that the determination of a nexus between the
condition and the projected harm is left solely to the municipality
60. See Morosoff, supra note 12, at 865.
61. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay v. City of Walnut
Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1971) (holding general public need justifies the required
exaction); Billings Properties Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964);
Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966).
62. See Billings, 394 P.2d at 185; see also infra note 64.
63. See Morosoff, supra note 12, at 865. "Under this judicial-deference standard,
exactions [sic] schemes are automatically approved whenever a local government
merely states that it found a connection between the exaction and some development-
created need. The burden is in effect placed upon the developer to show that the
scheme lacks the requisite nexus." Id.
64. See St. Jeanos, supra note 11, at 1889.
65. See Billings, 394 P.2d at 182; see also Jenad, 218 N.E.2d at 674 (deciding
whether it was constitutional to allow the Village Planning Board to require a devel-
oper to allot land or pay an impact fee as a condition precedent to the approval of the
proposed development). The Jenad Court held that the dedication of land or the
payment of an impact fee is constitutional if the evidence reasonably establishes that
the development creates the needs for such parks and playgrounds. 218 N.E.2d at 676
(citing Billings, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964)).
66. See id. at 184. The petitioner presented to the Planning Board of Yellowstone
County a plan to subdivide a parcel of land and requested the plan's approval. The
Planning Board denied petitioner's proposal because it did not include a dedication as
required by state law. See id. The developer sued claiming that the required dedica-
tion of land was a taking because it did not provide the developer with just compensa-
tion. See id.
67. See id. at 185. The opinion states, "An act of the legislature is presumed to be
valid ... [and] every intendment is in favor of upholding its constitutionality." (citing
Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 207 P. 993, 999 (Mont. 1922)).
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imposing the condition.68 Because the developer did not prove
that his subdivision would not create a need for a park, the Court
held that the exactions did not constitute a regulatory taking. 69
B. The "Rational Nexus" Standard
Courts using the "rational nexus" standard do not simply assume
the validity of the municipality's determination that an exaction is
necessary. 70 Instead, the reviewing court will require the munici-
pality to demonstrate that the exaction bears some "rational
nexus" to the negative impact of the proposed development.7 1
In Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls,72 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court applied the "rational nexus" standard in a case
where the Village passed an ordinance requiring a subdivider to
dedicate a portion of his land or pay an impact fee in lieu of the
dedication.73 In reviewing the ordinance, the Jordan Court held
that for an exaction requirement to be constitutional, the munici-
pality must provide evidence which reasonably establishes that ap-
proving the subdivision would require the municipality to provide
more land for schools, parks, and playgrounds.74 Based on the evi-
dence presented, the Court upheld the Village ordinance.
68. See id. at 188 ("The question of whether or not the subdivision created the
need for a park or the parks is one that has already been answered by our
Legislature.").
69. Id. at 188.
In the instant case no evidence has been introduced to rebut such presump-
tion and mindful of the duty of this court to uphold enactments of the Legis-
lature if there is any rational basis on which they can be upheld, it is found
that the statute is not an unreasonable exercise of the police power.
Id.
70. See St. Jeanos, supra note 11, at 1891 ("Courts will not defer to unfounded
assertions offered by a municipality to demonstrate why the exactions is necessary to
offset the harm.").
71. See, e.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that "the local government must demonstrate a reasonable
connection, or rational nexus" between the municipalities need and the potential
impact).
72. 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965).
73. See id. at 443. The municipality reasoned that such dedications were required
in order to provide for schools, parks and recreational needs. See id. at 443-44. The
subdividers, with full knowledge of the ordinance, proceeded with the project after
paying a $5,000 impact fee. See id. at 444. They then brought suit to have the money
returned claiming the fee was an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.
See id. at 445.
74. See id. at 448. "The test of reasonableness is always applicable to any attempt
to exercise the police power." Id.
75. See id. at 448-49. The Court found that the Village's evidence showing a signif-
icant growth in population and in local school enrollment, as well as expert testimony
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The "rational nexus" test thus requires a stricter level of scrutiny
than the "judicial deference" standard. 6 Courts use this standard
because it does not unduly inhibit the ability of government to reg-
ulate land use or give undue deference to legislative determina-
tions.77 This test attempts to balance the needs of the community
with the property rights of the developer.78 After its use in Jordan,
many state courts adopted it when deciding regulatory takings
cases.
79
C. The "Specifically and Uniquely Attributable" Standard
In contrast to the "judicial deference" and "rational nexus" stan-
dards, the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test applies strict
scrutiny when evaluating land use regulations.80 This test requires
that the imposed exaction be in direct proportion to a specifically
created need and thereby limits required exactions to those specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable to the impact of the development.81
regarding a healthy environment for human habitation, was enough to establish the
rational nexus between the development and the exaction. See id. The expert testi-
fied that a minimum of 3,000 square feet should be dedicated for parks and schools
for each family in the area, in order to create a "good environment for human habita-
tion". See id.
76. See Morosoff, supra note 12, at 868. "Straddling the fence between the judi-
cial-deference and the 'specifically and uniquely attributable' tests is a position known
as the rational-nexus test." Id.
77. See Delaney, supra note 58, at 154. "[T]he more moderate rational nexus test
... 'allows the local authorities to implement future oriented comprehensive planning
without according undue deference to legislative judgments."' Id. (quoting Wald
Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)).
78. See id.
79. See, e.g., Wald Corp., 338 So. 2d at 868 (stating that the rational nexus ap-
proach provides a more feasible basis for analyzing dedication requirements and
thereby explicitly adopting the rational nexus approach used in Jordan); Simpson v.
City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980) (holding that the exaction
requirement placed on the developer must have a reasonable relationship or nexus to
the use of the property, if no such nexus exists the requirement is invalid); Call v. City
of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257, 1258 (Utah 1980) (citing Jordan while applying the
rational nexus test).
80. See St. Jeanos, supra note 11, at 1890.
81. See id. "Several state courts require a precise correlation between the re-
quested exaction and the harms that would result from development. In jurisdictions
following this standard, the exaction must be found necessary to alleviate a harm that
will be caused specifically by the proposed development and is not attributable to
development in general." Id.
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The Illinois Supreme Court has championed this standard,82 and
other state courts have adopted it.83
82. The phrase "specifically and uniquely attributable" was first used in 1960 by
the Illinois Supreme Court in Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 167 N.E.2d 230 (Ill.
1960). The Court, in Rosen, held that a required dedication of land or the payment of
a fee, as a condition to development approval, must be specifically and uniquely at-
tributable to the developer's activities. See id. at 233. Furthermore, the planning
board's authority to regulate does not give them the power to require conditions in
order to solve all of the municipality's problems. See id. at 233-34. One year later, the
Illinois Supreme Court again applied this standard to another development exaction
imposed under the same state-enabling legislation relied upon in Rosen.
In Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill.
1961), the plaintiff was a subdivider who submitted a plan to the Mount Prospect
Planning Commission for approval. See id. at 800-01 (the proposal included the subdi-
vision of a parcel of land and the building of 250 residential units). The plaintiff's
proposal met all of the Planning Commission's requirements under the ordinance ex-
cept for a required dedication of a percentage of the land being developed. See id.
Under the statute, the plaintiff would have been required to dedicate 6.7 acres of land
to the village. The 6.7 acres of land required was going to be used as the location for a
new elementary school and playground. See id. Upon the plaintiff's refusal to dedi-
cate the land, the Commission refused to approve the subdivision proposal. See id.
The plaintiff brought suit claiming that the section of the ordinance requiring the land
dedication amounted to a taking without just compensation.
In deciding this case, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that a municipality under
development must consider present and future needs for schools and recreational fa-
cilities. See id. at 802. The Court states:
Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants in this case take the negative side of
the question as to the desirability either of education or recreation. The
question is not one of the desirability of education or recreation, nor of the
desirability to improve the public condition, but, rather, the question
presented here is one of determining who shall pay for such improvements.
Id.
The Court found, however, that the record did not establish that Mount Prospect's
need for such facilities was specifically and uniquely attributable to the plaintiff's de-
velopment. See id. at 802. The problem of overcrowded schools in Mount Prospect
was due to the development of the entire Mount Prospect community. See id.
The agreed statement of facts shows that the present school facilities of
Mount Prospect are near capacity. This is a result of the total development
of the community. If this whole community had not developed to such an
extent or if the existing school facilities were greater, the purported need
supposedly would not be present.
Id.
The plaintiff's proposal of an additional 250 homes did not create the problem, it
only added to a pre-existing municipal concern. The Court states, "Therefore, on the
record in this case the school problem which allegedly exists here is one which the
subdivider should not be obliged to pay the total cost of remedying, and to so con-
strue the statute would amount to an exercise of the power of eminent domain with-
out compensation." Id.
83. See McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 270 N.E.2d 370 (Ohio 1971). The
Court of Appeals of Ohio applied the standard when evaluating a land dedication
requirement for an off-site road improvement. The Planning Commission sought a
strip of land in order to repair a road that was 700 feet from the development sight
and "totally unrelated to the proposed subdivision." See id. at 374. The plaintiff
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Most recently, the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed the use of
the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test in its first regula-
tory takings case since the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Dolan.84 In Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass'n Inc. v. The
County of Du Page,85 the Illinois Supreme Court applied this stan-
dard when analyzing two state-enabling statutes permitting coun-
ties to impose transportation impact fees on new developments.86
In deciding the case, the Northern Illinois Court used the first
prong of the Dolan test and established that an essential nexus ex-
isted between preventing further traffic congestion and improving
roads.87 When it applied the second prong of the analysis, how-
ever, the Court used a higher level of scrutiny in determining
whether the exaction imposed was related enough to the potential
impact of the new development. Instead of using Dolan's "rough
proportionality" standard, the Illinois Supreme Court used the
"specifically and uniquely attributable" test 8  and held that Du
owned a single parcel of land, 3.71 acres in size. See id. at 372. The city demanded a
30-foot strip along one side of the parcel in order to widen an existing roadway. See
id. at 373.
In deciding the takings issue in the case, the Court agreed that a municipality may
require a developer to dedicate land if the proposed development creates such a need.
See id. at 374. These needs however, must be specifically and uniquely attributable to
the developer's activities. See id. If this is not the case, the regulation is in "contra-
vention of constitutional prohibitions" and is therefore forbidden. See id. The Court
found that the need to repair a road 700 feet from the proposed development sight,
and completely unrelated to the subdivision, did not satisfy the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" standard. See id.; see also Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 264
A.2d 910 (R.I. 1970) (holding that a city ordinance requiring a fixed percentage of the
developer's land will inevitably lead to inequities, and may not always meet the "spe-
cifically and uniquely attributable" test).
84. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
85. 649 N.E.2d 384 (I11. 1995).
86. See id. at 387. Although the state legislature had replaced the first enabling
statute with the second, DuPage had enacted local ordinances under both and there-
fore both statutes required review. See id. Under the first enabling act, DuPage
County passed an ordinance which called for the collection of impact fees in order
"[T]o ensure that the new development pays a fair share of the costs of transportation
improvements needed to serve new development." See id. at 388.
A year and a half later, the state legislature repealed the first enabling act and
passed the Road Improvement Impact Fee Law. (605 ILCS 5/5-901 et seq. (West
1992)) See id. This second enabling act included the language, "[a]n impact fee paya-
ble by a developer shall not exceed a proportionate share of costs incurred by a unit
of local government which are specifically and uniquely attributable to the new devel-
opment paying the fee." Id. DuPage County subsequently amended its impact fee
ordinances to reflect a number of changes. The new ordinances reflected changes in
the previous ordinance's impact fee schedules as well as in changes in fuel and prop-
erty taxes. See id.
87. See id. at 389.
88. See id. The opinion states:
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Page would impose impact fees only for road improvements made
necessary by the new development.8 9 Moreover, the new develop-
ment paying the fee must receive a "direct and material benefit"
from the improvements the fee had financed. 90
III. Where Do We Go from Here: A Resolution to the
Question of Judicial Scrutiny in Takings Law
While the Supreme Court has refined its approach to the takings
issue, state and lower courts continue to grapple with the question
of how and when to apply the Nollan/Dolan standard.91 It is time
courts adopt a unified interpretation.
A. Interpreting the Scope and Application of Nollan and
Dolan
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Nollan,92 estab-
lishing the "essential nexus" requirement,93 has had several effects
on the regulatory takings issue. First, the Supreme Court made it
clear that municipalities would no longer be permitted to trade de-
velopment rights for exactions that were unrelated to the projected
impact of the development, and thus courts would be forced to
look closely at the proffered reasons for the condition imposed.94
The appellate court correctly found, and the parties agree, that Pioneer Trust
sets forth the standard applicable in this case. Thus, "in order for the impact
fee to pass constitutional muster the need for road improvement impact fees
must be 'specifically and uniquely attributable' to the new development pay-
ing the fee."
Id. (quoting Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799,
802 (Ill. 1961)). In completing its analysis of this issue, the Court found that only the
second of the two enabling acts met the strict requirements of the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" standard. See id. at 389. The majority reasoned that because
this enabling act contained the phrase "specifically and uniquely attributable" it ex-
pressly mandated the required degree of connection between the exaction and the
development. See id. The Court also relied on the fact that the second enabling act
provided a clear definition of what "specifically and uniquely attributable" means.
See id. The act states in its definitional section:
Specifically and uniquely attributable means that a new development creates
the need, or an identifiable portion of the need, for additional capacity to be
provided by a road improvement. Each new development paying impact
fees used to fund a road improvement must receive a direct and material
benefit from the road improvement constructed with impact fees paid.
Id. at 389-90 (quoting the definitional section of 605 ILCS 5/5-903 (West 1992)).
89. See id. at 390.
90. See id.
91. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
92. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
93. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
94. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
590
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Nollan also was an indication that the Court was preparing to
reinvestigate the role of the Takings Clause in protecting private
property rights and limiting land use regulations.95
In Dolan,96 the Supreme Court added the "rough proportional-
ity" prong, and thus determined the required degree of connection
between the exactions imposed and the projected impacts of the
proposed development. 97 The Court did not, however, clarify the
scope of Dolan's application.98 It remains unclear whether the
"rough proportionality" standard should be applied only to regula-
tions that require a physical dedication of land, or if its scope is
broader.
The Dolan standard clearly applies to exactions that require
physical dedications of property because the Court's decision spe-
cifically relies on the fact that Tigard's restriction required a dedi-
cation of Dolan's property. 99 In Dolan, the Court also noted its
traditional concern for government actions that focus on individual
citizens as opposed to society as a whole.100 Moreover, most condi-
tions requiring physical dedications involve particular parcels of
land and individual landowners, and thus are almost always subject
to the Dolan test.
It is unclear, however, whether Dolan applies to the imposition
of impact fees. The day after the Dolan decision was announced,
the Supreme Court remanded a California Supreme Court case for
reconsideration in light of its decision in Dolan.1°1 The California
case, Ehrlich v. City of Culver,102 did not involve a physical dedica-
tion of land, but rather a landowner who was required to pay a
$280,000 impact fee in order to get his project approved. 3 The
Supreme Court's instruction to review the case under Dolan
strongly suggests that it intended the Dolan standard to apply to
impact fees as well as physical dedications when such conditions
were imposed on an individual basis.104
95. See DAVID A. SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
128 (Transactions Books eds., 1992).
96. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
97. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
98. See Cordes, supra note 43, at 538.
99. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385-86; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
100. See Dolan 512 U.S. at 385-86.
101. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 246.
102. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
103. See id. at 471.
104. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 248. ("By vacating this decision one day after
deciding Dolan, with instructions to the lower court to reconsider their holding specif-
ically in light of Dolan, the Supreme Court impliedly suggested that impact fees
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The Nollan/Dolan standard should be applied to impact fees be-
cause the Supreme Court, in both opinions, continually used the
phrase "permit condition" as opposed to "land exaction" or "physi-
cal dedication. '10 5 In both cases, however, the condition imposed
by the municipality required a physical dedication of land.106 If the
Court's intent was to limit the standards to only physical exactions,
it consistently would have referred to these types of conditions. In-
stead, the Court referred to the municipality's requirements as
"permit conditions,"'0 7 and therefore revealed its intent to apply
the Dolan standard to impact fees as well.
Moreover, Nollan and Dolan should apply to impact fees be-
cause the Supreme Court, in both opinions, demonstrated its com-
mitment to strengthen the proection of the Fifth Amendment's
Taking Clause and reassert the importance of protecting individual
property rights under the Clause. 08 A narrow reading of these
cases would unnecessarily weaken the Court's clear intent. 0 9
should be judicially evaluated by the same standards.") (footnote omitted); see also
R.S. Radford, Rent Control and Regulatory Takings, in Inverse Condemnation and
Related Government Liability 473 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study No. C997, 1995)
("By vacating and remanding for reconsideration under the Dolan analysis, the
Supreme Court eliminated any doubt that it intends the heightened standards of Nol-
lan and Dolan to apply to regulations not involving a physical interference with
land.").
105. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987). "The
Commission argues that a permit condition that serves the same legitimate police-
power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should not be found to be a taking if
the refusal to issue the permit would not constitute a taking." Id. (emphasis added).
"We therefore find that the Commission's imposition of the permit condition cannot
be treated as an exercise of its land-use power for any of these purposes." Id. at 839
(emphasis added). See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386. "In evaluating petitioner's claim, we
must first determine whether the 'essential nexus' exists between the 'legitimate state
interest' and the permit condition exacted by the city." Id. (emphasis added). "The
second part of our analysis requires us to determine whether the degree of the exac-
tions demanded by the city's permit conditions bears the required relationship to the
projected impact of petitioner's proposed development." Id. at 388 (emphasis
added).
106. See supra notes 38, 49, 50 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
108. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841 ("We view the Fifth Amendment's Property Clause
to be more than a pleading requirement."); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 392 ("We see no reason
why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights
as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a
poor relation in these comparable circumstances."); see also Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding land use regulation which deprives
owner of all economic value of land constitutes a taking); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that govern-
ment must pay compensation for temporary regulatory taking).
109. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 252 (footnote omitted).
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Whether Dolan applies to land use regulations based on broad
legislative decisions is also a matter of debate. Language in the
opinion suggests that the Dolan standard does not apply to such
broad legislative acts. 110 For example, zoning ordinances which re-
strict land use in a specific section of a city are not subject to the
Dolan standard because the burden of the state interest being ad-
vanced is placed on the community as a whole.' Dolan's two-
prong test should apply only when the cost of a benefit to society is
being disproportionately placed on an individual landowner, not to
broad legislative acts.
B. The Protection of Property Rights
Conditioning an individual's permit approval on the dedication
of land or the payment of a fee is a different exercise of power than
the government's power to pass regulations that effect society as a
whole. In Dolan the Supreme Court attempted to ensure that the
exercise of this power does not result in an unfair burden placed on
an individual.1 12 In deciding Dolan, however, the Supreme Court
adopted only an intermediate level of scrutiny,' 13 and thus failed to
resolve the confusion and potential for government abuse sur-
rounding the regulatory takings issue. Therefore, the Supreme
Court should adopt one bright line, strict scrutiny test, in order to
protect the private property rights of individuals singled out by the
government for regulatory takings.
1. The Ineffectiveness of the "Judicial Deference" Standard
The inherent shortcomings of the "judicial deference" standard
are clear because the municipality imposing the exaction is the
branch of government that determines the nexus between the exac-
tion and the projected harm. Therefore, under this standard, the
exactions imposed are constitutional if the municipality says they
are.1 4 Allowing the municipality to make these determinations
110. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384. In the opinion, the Court acknowledges the impor-
tance and necessity of allowing state and local governments to engage in land use
planning and points out the traditional power of governments to do so. See id.; see
also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("Government hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law.").
111. See Cordes, supra note 43, at 538.
112. See infra note 125.
113. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390.
114. See Jenad, 218 N.E.2d at 677. The dissent states, "The principle of decision in
this case would constitutionally allow municipal officers to prohibit real estate devel-
opment in cities, towns and villages unless the newcomers pay whatever sums of
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without a high level of judicial scrutiny creates the potential for
abuse of a municipality's police power. In jurisdictions using the
"judicial deference" standard, conditions imposed by municipali-
ties are almost always constitutional.' 15
2. The "Rational Nexus" Standard: Not Strict Enough
Despite its popularity in state courts, the "rational nexus" stan-
dard is simply not strict enough when used to analyze required ex-
actions, because a "reasonableness" standard does not require a
direct correlation between the alleged public need and the pro-
posed development.1 16 Instead, it allows a municipality to present
evidence to show that any one of a number of municipal concerns
exist and that the required exaction will help alleviate one of those
concerns.
11 7
For instance, concern for a growing population or overcrowded
schools is likely a concern for a municipality at all times. Why
should the developer pay to alleviate a pre-existing problem that
the local government has been concerned with all along? Courts
should force municipalities to prove that a new development spe-
cifically exacerbates a pre-existing problem, and hold the devel-
oper liable only for the cost of the aggravation and not the entire
problem.
If the developer dedicates land or pays a fee, then the people
who live in the immediate area or who will live in that develop-
ment should benefit from the exaction. The "rational nexus" stan-
dard does not guarantee that the specific harm cited will be
alleviated by the exaction because the standard does not require a
direct correlation between the harm cited and the exaction im-
posed. Thus, it is time for the judiciary to challenge the abuse of
development exactions in local government by increasing the level
of scrutiny applied in deciding land use cases.118
C. The "Specifically and Uniquely Attributable" Standard: A
Call for Strict Scrutiny
The use of the "specifically and uniquely attributable" standard
by the Illinois Supreme Court has been controversial since the
money the local public authorities may decide arbitrarily to impose upon them ...
without relation to special benefits or assessed valuation." Id.
115. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
116. See Morosoff, supra note 12, at 869.
117. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
118. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 254.
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United States Supreme Court decided Dolan.119 The reaffirmance
of this test is important not only to the builders in Illinois, but also
to private property owners nationwide. It exemplifies a judicial
movement to restore private property rights and level the playing
field on which developers and local governments interact.
1. Curbing Government Abuse of Power
In drafting the Fifth Amendment, one of Madison's intentions in
protecting private property was to ensure citizens a more extensive
domain of liberty. 120 Thus, property is not only a right, but also
performs the function of maintaining independence so that other
individual rights may be protected from the majority.121 When
property rights are threatened, the danger of losing other civil
rights exists because the sphere of protection that private property
provides is weakened.1 22 In a constitutional democracy, such as in
the United States, the right to property defines the areas in which
the majority must yield to the minority. 123 Therefore, such rights
need to be protected with nothing less than the judiciary's strictest
level of scrutiny.
Advocates of heightened scrutiny argue that only rigorous judi-
cial review will protect against the overreaching and abuse of gov-
ernment power. 124 Allowing municipalities to package the issuance
of permits with the conditions of exactions is an example of such an
abuse. When this bundling of permits and exactions is allowed to
119. See generally J. Linn Allen, Too high a price? Builders across US. contest im-
pact fees, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 1992, at 1. Local government officials argue that this
standard is simply to tough for them to meet and to easy for the developer's to over-
come when an exaction is imposed. See id. According to these officials, tax caps
make it extremely hard to finance the building of schools, parks, and roads in order to
accommodate community growth and impact fees and required land dedications are
the only way these municipalities can do so. They had hoped the Illinois Supreme
Court would abandon this standard for the two prong test used in Dolan. See id.
Builders and developers however, are obviously pleased with the reaffirming of this
standard. According to them, impact fees and land dedications make building unaf-
fordable and significantly raise the prices of affordable homes. It is this test, the devel-
opers claim, that levels an unbalanced playing field. See id.
120. See Barros, supra note 21, at 1858; see also supra note 22 and accompanying
text.
121. See Barros, supra note 21.
122. See id. at 1857-58.
123. See id.
124. See St. Jeanos, supra note 11, at 1903 (citing the Brief of the Institute for Jus-
tice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11-12, Dolan (No. 93-518)).
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occur, developers are often forced to bear the burdens that the
Takings Clause was designed to eliminate. 25
As Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass'n Inc. v. County of
DuPage 1 6 exemplifies, the "specifically and uniquely attributable"
standard decreases the likelihood of such an injustice because it
requires that the new development specifically create the need for
which the exaction is imposed, 27 and assures that the development
receive a material benefit from the improvement that the fee fi-
nances.12 8 Local governments and municipalities, however, retain
the power to consider and regulate community growth under this
test. As long as the cost placed on the developer is specifically and
uniquely attributable to his/her activities, there is no violation of
the developer's property rights.
According to Professor Richard Epstein, "[e]rrors of overinclu-
sion occur when the regulation sweeps wider than necessary to
control the identified evil . ".. 19 In effect, these overinclusive
errors lead to individual land owners being forced to bear the costs
of society because the municipality is requiring more from the indi-
vidual than is needed to offset the individual's activities. The Nol-
lan/Dolan standard does not prevent such an injustice because it
does not guarantee that the development dedicating the land or
paying the fee is, in fact, the development that will receive the ma-
terial benefit from the required dedication. The "specifically and
uniquely attributable" standard, however, will strike down any reg-
ulation that requires more of an exaction than is needed to offset
the externalities of the proposed development.1 30
In guarding against the overreaching abuse of a local govern-
ment's police power,3 the "specifically and uniquely attributable"
standard also examines the municipality's incentive for using this
125. The United States Supreme Court has stated, "(o)ne of the principal purposes
of the Takings Clause is 'to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."' Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
126. 649 N.E.2d 384 (Ill. 1995).
127. See id. at 389; see also supra note 88 and accompanying text.
128. See id. at 389-90; see also supra note 88 and accompanying text.
129. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EM-
INENT DOMAIN 127-28 (1985).
130. See Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass'n, 649 N.E.2d at 390-91; see also
supra note 88 and accompanying text.
131. See generally Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 172 A.2d 40,
47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961) ("The municipality, regardless of its good inten-
tions, may not coerce an owner to do something except through channels prescribed
by law.").
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power. If a municipality's power to issue development permits
conditioned on exactions goes unchecked, the municipality has an
enormous incentive to solve all types of problems unrelated to the
development. 132 By requiring that the development be the specific
cause of the impact for which the exaction is imposed, the local
government no longer has such an incentive because local officials
would know that their actions would be analyzed under rigorous
judicial scrutiny. Therefore, under this standard, there is little
room for the government to abuse its power by unfairly taking land
and imposing impact fees.
2. Balancing the Unstable Political Process
Heightened scrutiny also is necessary because the political pro-
cess is directly connected to the problems surrounding the takings
issue. 33 Often, local politics create factions that discriminate
against outside developers or individuals who do not have voting
rights or political clout within the community.1 34 Upon entering
the community with a development proposal, these individuals
must face local land use regulations without the aid of the political
process.1 35
In addition, most land use regulations are not self-executing.1 36
Instead, a broad regulation is applied and enforced by local plan-
ning boards that are influenced by the municipality's officials and
insiders. 37 According to Professor Epstein, "[a]n enormous slip-
page thus occurs between the articulation of a general principle
and its concrete application.' 1 38 Therefore, what tends to happen
is that the actual application of the regulation becomes skewed by
the influence of local officials and protesters seeking to avoid the
development completely or to avoid the payment of just
compensation.
The "specifically and uniquely attributable" standard's strict
scrutiny is necessary to balance the unstable political process that
administers land use regulations. 139 By applying this test to re-
132. See St. Jeanos, supra note 11, at 1904 n.151 (citing the Brief of the Institute for
Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 20, Dolan (No. 93-518)).
133. See EPSTEIN, supra note 129, at 265.
134. See id. at 264.
135. See id. ("[W]hy should they be required to negotiate the hurdles of the local
zoning procedures in order to overcome obstacles to land development that never
should have been erected in the first instance?").
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See EPSTEIN, supra note 129, at 265.
139. See id.
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quired physical exactions and impact fees, the reviewing court will
be able to: 1) directly measure the impact of the regulation; 2) sort
through the political red-tape and examine the true motive of the
municipality imposing the exaction; and 3) if necessary, determine
the correct amount of compensation owed to the individual prop-
140erty owner.
3. The "Specifically and Uniquely Attributable" Standard Is Not
"Too Exacting"
Government officials and other opponents of heightened scru-
tiny believe that the "specifically and uniquely attributable" stan-
dard is too exacting."' They argue that this test requires a showing
of data and information about proposed projects that is practically
impossible to obtain, and that it rarely results in the finding of a
sufficient nexus between the need created and the exaction
imposed.1 42
This argument is flawed, however, because a municipality that
has the resources to meet the intermediate standard of review also
has the resources to show that the exaction is specifically and
uniquely attributable to the new development. Once this burden is
met, the development is guaranteed a direct and material benefit
from either the land given or the fee paid. The municipality can
make its necessary improvements, at the cost of the developer,
without unconstitutionally limiting the latter's right to private
property. Moreover, this increased burden on the municipality is
justified because an individual's property rights are at stake.
4. The "Specifically and Uniquely Attributable" Standard Does
Not Prohibit Government Land Use Regulations
Law and economics advocates also argue against the use of strict
scrutiny in land use regulation cases.143 They contend that the
trade of a permit for an exaction is an efficient transfer which
keeps the market competitive and thus benefits society as a
140. See id. at 266.
141. See Gerald P. Callaghan, Illinois High Court Reaffirms Strict Test For Develop-
ment Fees, 18 CHi. LAWYER 73 (May 1995). Many of the opponents use the same
reasoning as the United States Supreme Court did in Dolan, however the Court in
that case relied on the "nature of the interests at stake." See Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374, 3889-90 (1994).
142. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 226 (citation omitted).
143. See St. Jeanos, supra note 11, at 1904 (noting that economists argue that the
swap of an exaction for a permit to develop is an efficient transfer).
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whole. 1" These opponents also argue that the "Lochner Era 145
established that courts have no authority to review governmental
economic decisions, such as the financing of public roads and
schools.146
While the economic argument presents legitimate concerns when
discussing the role of courts in a municipality's business decisions,
it is not persuasive when the constitutional right to property is at
stake. The "specifically and uniquely attributable" test does not
eliminate a municipality's right to regulate land use, a necessary
function in modern day society. 147 Instead, this standard allows
courts to protect landowners from municipal overreaching and
abuse of power without becoming improperly involved in the mu-
nicipality's decisions. Moreover, it removes the municipality's in-
centive to abuse its power to regulate land use. When the
municipality attempts to do so, the "specifically and uniquely at-
tributable" standard provides the courts with a bright line test to
use in order to protect an individual's property rights.
Conclusion
In the controversy surrounding land use exactions, the Fifth
Amendment should be interpreted to permit an individual to freely
develop property without bearing unfair costs imposed by a munic-
ipality. With the use of minimum or intermediate levels of review,
the protection afforded by the Takings Clause is improperly re-
duced. By requiring that land use exactions be specifically and
uniquely attributable to the projected impact of the new develop-
ment, individual private property rights will be restored.
144. See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 544 (1991).
145. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 829-31 (3d ed. 1996).
The "Lochner-era" refers to the time period between 1905 and 1934 when the United
States Supreme Court used heightened judicial scrutiny, relying on the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to strike down approximately 200 economic
regulations. Id.
146. See St. Jeanos, supra note 11, at 1905.
147. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 1994) (noting that the power of
state and local governments to engage in land use regulation still exists).
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